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A Summary Reflection on Legal Education
Robert A. Pascal
FOREWORD BY OLIVIER MORItTEAU1
A Summary Reflection on Legal Education is the fruit of decades
of reflection by a very unique scholar whose life covered most of the
twentieth century and who is still active in the twenty-first.
Professor Emeritus Robert A. Pascal started his academic career at
the time of Roscoe Pound, whom he witnessed inaugurating the
LSU Law Building in 1938.2 He then was a law student at the
Loyola Law School in New Orleans and served during the summer
as a Research Assistant at LSU. He published his first article in the
first issue of the Louisiana Law Review, also seventy years ago.
3
Robert Pascal conversed with some of the great pioneers of
comparative legal studies, such as Ernst Rabel, John P. Dawson, and
Hessel Yntema in Ann Arbor, Max Rheinstein in Chicago, Gino
Gorla in Rome, and Ren6 David in Paris. He is far too modest to
accept being portrayed as a living legend but may accept being
referred to as a living memory: few law schools having reached their
centennial, like LSU in 2006, can claim to have within their walls a
faculty member who has been on Earth nearly as long as the law
school. In addition, he started working with the Louisiana State Law
Institute during the first year of its creation, working on the
Compiled Edition of the Louisiana Civil Codes. He later became a
consultant on trust law revision, an area of jurisprudence where his
thoughts are at the forefront.4 He also taught and produced
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significant work on conflict of laws, 5 family law, matrimonial
regimes, 7 civil and Anglo-American legal science,8 and philosophy
of law.
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In 1940, he was the first person ever to be awarded a Master's
degree in Civil Law at LSU. He practiced law in New Orleans for
one year, and in 1942, added an LL.M. from the University of
Michigan Law School. During World War II, he was commissioned
in the United States Coast Guard Reserve for anti-submarine
warfare, but most of his service was as Coast Guard District Legal
Officer for the 10th Naval District (the Caribbean). At the end of the
war, he joined the LSU law faculty. In spring 1951, he taught trusts
law at the University of Chicago. In 1951-1952 and in 1963-1964,
he was a Fulbright lecturer and taught U.S. private law and
comparative law at the University of Rome, in Italian.' 0 In 1955, he
Trust Estates Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 639 (1963). See also Robert A. Pascal, The
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was made full professor at LSU and never left the Law School even
after his retirement in 1980, keeping offices as a Professor Emeritus.
In this year of the Bicentennial of the Louisiana Civil Code, many
remember his tournament' with a professor from Tulane, Professor
Pascal rightly insisting that the Digest of 180812 was Spanish in
substance and French in form-a "Spanish girl in French dress," as
he later commented in his Tucker Lecture at LSU.13
The author of this Foreword has the privilege of meeting and
exchanging views with Professor Pascal on a daily basis. He read
this Summary Reflection more than two years before publication, as
it was still in the making. He quickly decided to offer it to his first
year law students at LSU as an opening to the Legal Traditions
class. In his Summary Reflection, Professor Pascal makes his vision
of the law very clear. He sees the law as legal order, mankind as a
community of men under God, with the ontological (moral)
obligation to respect and cooperate with one another. His comment
on the secularization of law and science in the past five hundred
years is connected to the evolution of religious thought, and while
this may be found disturbing by some, it reflects the findings of
philosophers, theologians, and historians of western societies.
His strong preference for the civil law and its codification comes
from the fact that it gives a comprehensive vision of what the law is
and makes it accessible and predictable to lawyers, judges, and
laymen. The writer of this Foreword, also a civilian by training,
certainly agrees, yet remains a great admirer of the basic tenet of the
English common law--"law is right reason"-and its ability to
discover the law in a constant search of consistency through the
facts of cases, always accepting, though reluctantly, that what was
wrongly declared may later be overruled. The traditional approach
of the common law, often to be distinguished from modem
American and sometimes English practice, does not question
July & Aug. 1964, at 5); ROBERT A. PASCAL, CORSO DI DIRITTO PRIvATO
STATUNITENSE: APPUNTI TRATIrI DALLE LEZIONI (Citta di Castello (Italy) 1953).
11. See Robert A. Pascal, A Report on the Reprint of Moreau-Lislet's Copy
of a Digest of the Civil Laws, in 1 LOUISIANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 43 (2d series
1973); Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972).
12. A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS (enacted Mar. 31, 1808), available at www.law.lsu.edu/digest.
13. Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV 301, 303 (1998).
14. Robert A. Pascal had a close relation with Eric Voegelin. See Interview
of Robert A. Pascal on Eric Voegelin, in BARRY COOPER, VOEGELIN
RECOLLECTED 165-66 (2008); ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NATURE OF THE LAW AND
OTHER LEGAL WRITINGS (Robert A. Pascal, James Lee Babin & John William
Corrington eds., 1991).
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Professor Pascal's recognition of fundamental principles, nor his
belief that the law cannot be limited to what is termed positive law.
Some students who have read and discussed this Summary
Reflection in the fall semesters of 2006 and 2007 reacted to the
negative outlook that Professor Pascal projects on the present state
of the legal profession. It comes as a salutary shock to prospective
students at both ends of the spectrum, whether they view legal
practice as a good money maker or come to law school with the
ideal of serving the community and their fellow citizens.
With clear and precise strokes, Robert Pascal depicts the huge,
often neglected impact legal education has on the shaping of a legal
system and the way it operates showing how the case method, if
made the exclusive tool of legal education, drifts the thoughts away
from principles and prevents students from developing an overall
view of what the law is or ought to be. Robert Pascal believes that
one should not be allowed to become a lawyer without a solid liberal
education. 1 A study of what the purpose of the law is and its moral
foundations, whether one calls it legal theory, philosophy, or
jurisprudence, ought to have its place before or at the beginning of
the legal curriculum, so that future practitioners are made aware that
the law is much more than an artifact serving sometimes purely
materialistic interests. Rights may not be considered without a
careful analysis of corresponding obligations. Throughout his
teaching career, Professor Pascal reminded his students, citing
Ulpian and Justinian, that legal professionals are "priests of right
order."
Whether one agrees or not to this basic tenet and to other points
made in the Summary Reflection, it triggers discussion and reflection
and, most importantly, invites one to put the essential (by nature the
less visible) at the front door of legal studies, hoping it will inspire
legal practice and law making.' 6 It comes at a time when the topic of
legal education moves to the forefront of legal scholarship, at a
moment when the law school that has led America into the case
method revises its curriculum. May this publication prove that what
some describe as voices of the past are most useful beacons of
human progress: this is a future oriented reflection.
15. Some of his ideas on the curriculum were expressed early in
Memorandum to the Dean and Faculty of the LSU Law School (Nov. 15, 1966), in
ALAN WATSON, THE SHAME OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 205 (2d ed. 2007).
16. See Olivier Mordteau, Bilan de santi de l'enseignement du droit, in
MELANGES JACQUES VANDERLINDEN 273-301 (2006).
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THE ESSAY BY ROBERT A. PASCAL
Disrespect for the legal order has become endemic. In general,
both its professionals and the public at large manifest it. Lawyers
often seek to manipulate the law to serve clients' purposes,
whether or not the result is consistent with the order it projects,
regarding their practice more as a power service for those who can
pay their exorbitant fees than as a profession at the service of good
order. Indeed, for many in the public at large and for many
professionals, the very notion of law as a plan of order to be
respected, honored, and obeyed is considered an infringement on
individual freedom (and, recently, privacy). Clients demand lawyer
delinquency for selfish reasons and, at the same time, knowing
their champions to be willing delinquents, distrust them. Elected
judges are suspected of being inclined to favor persons represented
by attorneys who have contributed to their campaigns for election.
Appointed judges are expected to interpret and apply the law in
terms of the political, economic, religious, and philosophical views
of those who control their appointments. Legislators are believed
to be influenced unduly by the generous offerings of lobbyists and
to vote their benefactors' or constituents' wishes even if they know
them to be contrary to the common good. Practicing lawyers
serving as members of law reform groups have been known to
sponsor their clients' selfish interests rather than the general good.
For most persons, lawyers, judges, legislators, and the public,
law is the instrument of power par excellence. Justice, equality,
fairness, and the common good often are ignored, though the
rhetoric in use pretends they are of concern. The degree of
selfishness dominating the practice of law can be judged by the
enormity of the fees charged, the relatively little attention given
those unable to pay them, and the manner in which established law
firms mistreat their young associates, requiring so many hours of
effort from them that often they must leave home before their
children awake and return home after they have fallen asleep.
Shamefully, legal education in the United States has
contributed, and continues to contribute, to this societal disaster.
Law schools have not demanded that the would-be law student
have an education in which he has been asked to ponder what it
means to be human, or what relation he has to others by reason of
his nature, or whether there is anything like a moral obligation. A
college degree of any kind suffices for enrollment, though it may
evidence no more than intense vocational training in engineering,
natural science, mathematics, business, or canoe paddling. Nor do
law schools attempt to supply the deficiency during law studies.
Once in law school the student may have the opportunity to elect a
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course in "legal philosophy", "legal theory", or "jurisprudence",
but very often such courses are sketchy surveys without demand
for critical appraisal. Most students (and many faculty members)
regard them as perhaps interesting, but nevertheless irrelevant to
the "practical" world of law.
Indeed, learning what history has taught us about man's
awareness of his nature and his relation to others need not be a
prerequisite for legal studies as usually conceived in the United
States today. If law itself is regarded as nothing more than the
record of previous battles for power in courts and legislatures, a
record of humanly created "facts" not qualifiable as good or bad, if
the notion of law as an order for men in society projected for their
common good is rejected and there is substituted in its place a
concept of "problem solving" when the posited aims of individuals
clash, then training in rhetoric will suffice.
In essence, this thought predominates in legal education in the
United States today. Its inadequacy was addressed brilliantly by
Robert Maynard Hutchins, once dean of the Yale Law School and
the president of the University of Chicago when, in 1933, he
addressed the Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools. His message was very clear. Law schools could
remain as they were-and yet are-if every university would
establish in its college of liberal arts a "Department of
Jurisprudence" so that would-be law students could receive
adequate exposure to the liberal arts and to the art, science,
purpose, and obligatory moral force of law before entering law
school for their professional training. Unfortunately, his plea was
not heard.
It is not difficult to trace in bold outline the change in thought
leading to the current cultural crisis. Until the 1500's, in the era of
Christendom, the prevailing thought in Western culture was that
metaphysics as well as revelation permitted the affirmance of the
following propositions: (1) the existence of all persons as an
ontological community under God; (2) the existence, therefore, of
the ontological (moral) obligation of each person, as part of the
whole, to respect and cooperate with every other for the spiritual
and material good of each and all-an obligation in justice at least
for the metaphysician, but in charity and mercy as well for the
believer in revelation; and (3) the moral certainty of one's
conscious existence after death in a state of beatitude
commensurate with one's degree of holiness in life, that is to say,
one's conscientious endeavor during life to discover one's relation
to God and other persons and, with God's grace, to live
accordingly. Under this understanding of the human condition, just
political societies, their just laws, and lawful private agreements,
130 [Vol. 69
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could be recognized as institutions through which the general,
unspecified, ontologically founded moral obligation to respect and
cooperate with all persons is made specific for persons in particular
societies of particular cultures in particular circumstances of time
and place, as such morally obligatory, entitled to respect, honor,
and obedience, and justly sanctioned by one's conscience, political
force, and fear of social opprobrium.
In the last five hundred years, however, as Eric Voegelin
summarized in his The New Science of Politics (1951), a gradual
change in thought has come to dominate in the public sphere. It
discredits and ignores both revelation and metaphysics as valid
sources of morally obligatory norms of human action, and does so
on the basis of a gratuitous assertion that only the empirically
demonstrable may be taken to be true. If this is so, then neither
God, nor the ontological community of persons, nor life after
death, need to be taken into account in human affairs, for none is
subject to empirical verification. Persons, accordingly, are to be
considered simply as individual beings, unrelated to each other in
the ontological order, without moral obligations to each other,
living a life without discoverable meaning and without hope of
conscious existence after death. Under this misunderstanding of
the ontological condition of man, each person becomes his own
god. Individualism is born. Exercise of power over others to attain
one's posited, criteria-less objectives can become one's way of
life. Concern for others can be subordinated without guilt to the
attainment of one's personal wishes. Conventional morals and laws
and associations and contracts of all kinds then may have
prudential force, but, being without ontologically based moral
force, cannot bind in conscience.
Protestantism, perhaps unwittingly, added to the spread of
individualism. The followers of Luther and Calvin, perhaps
adhering too literally to St. Paul's admonition to rely on the word
of God rather than human wisdom, limit themselves to revelation,
limit that to the Bible, and then interpret the Bible in ways that
eliminate personal holiness as a condition for salvation. For
Luther, one's salvation depends entirely on one's justification
through faith (trust) in Christ as savior, itself a free gift of God that
can not be earned. For Calvin, God predestines some persons to
salvation and others to damnation, without regard to their actions
during life.
In each case, individuals are unable to contribute to their own
salvation. Ontologically based morality and concern for others
logically become irrelevant to salvation. Even the Biblical morality
taught so zealously by Protestants logically can have relevance
only as a calculus for the individual's earthly happiness. Then, too,
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the Protestant tenet of individual interpretation of Scripture renders
morality purely subjective, reinforcing the spirit of individualism.
Whatever the explanation, the observable fact is that high
individualism, and its logical corollary, selfishness, pervade the
American mind and that their source and raison d'tre must lie
ultimately, at least in large measure, in the secular and religious
influences that have no room for the community of man under God
and its corollary, the ontological moral obligation to respect and
cooperate with everyone for the spiritual and temporal good of all.
It is a spirit that makes competition normal and thus gives pseudo-
legitimacy to a life in which taking advantage of another is not
regarded as morally wrong.
In this truly anti-intellectual and normless milieu, individualist
and self-centered, combative rather than cooperative, it is no
wonder that legislation and judicial opinion have come to be
regarded as no more than records of previous competitions among
men in legislatures and courts, non-normative human acts-mere
facts-that might be manipulated for selfish purposes in later
"legal" conflicts with others. Europe and the Americas all have
suffered from this development, but Anglo-American jurisdictions,
particularly those in the United States, have felt it more than the
modem Romanist jurisdictions. It is suggested that the difference
can be accounted for by the manner in which law is perceived,
evidenced, organized, promulgated, studied, and taught in the two
legal cultures.
Since the French Revolution most modem Romanist
jurisdictions tend to limit law to legislation enacted by the elected
representatives of the people in legislative assembly. Nothing else
may be considered law. Once enacted it stands as a closed frame of
reference. There is no recognition of the relevance of a former
historically developed background law, or of philosophical or
theological principles against which it may be construed,
interpreted, or appraised. The will of the legislature is its only
norm. John Henry Merryman once said that modem Romanist law
is culturally agnostic. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that
in most modem Romanist jurisdictions what constitutes right order
(jus in Latin), and therefore justice, is exclusively the province of
the legislature, and that both the judiciary and the executive are
limited to rectitude in the application and enforcement of the
legislation.
This legislative positivism does place enormous moral
responsibility on the legislature, but it does offer definite
advantages. One is that all judicial decisions must be based on the
legislation. Another is that decisions may not be regarded as
binding precedents, though everywhere a long line of decisions
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interpreting or applying the legislation in a certain way can be
persuasive. A third is that the legislature must aim at a complete
statement of the legal order. Perfection being impossible, almost
all Romanist jurisdictions permit the judiciary to decide the case
for which there is no legislative rule by specifying a rule based on
principles explicit or implicit in the legislation as a whole. In this
fashion the legislation remains the ultimate reference. The fourth
and greatest advantage of legislative positivism, however, is that
the law, being limited to legislation, may be promulgated in its
fullness.
The fullness of promulgation in modem Romanist jurisdictions
usually is enhanced many times over by the fact that the main
legislation on private law, the civil and the commercial, is to be
found in civil and commercial codes that tend to be splendidly
organized, conceptual and abstract in their provisions, carefully
integrated and internally consistent, and written in simple, non-
technical vocabulary. Thus organized and written, the codes make
possible a reasonable understanding of the basic law by anyone
who can read. The same organization and usual clarity of
expression have facilitated the development of treatises and
manuals of different levels that provide further promulgation for
laymen and professionals and facilitate instruction in (and study
of) the law with economy of effort. The result is a popular and
professional awareness of the law that makes it difficult for both
laymen and professionals to avoid its provisions by deliberate
falsification or obfuscation. Differences in construction,
interpretation, and methods of application can and do exist, but
seldom is there a question as to what rule of law applies or what is
its basic import.
Those subject to Anglo-American private law have not been so
fortunate. The limitation of law to a simply stated, complete, and
conceptually consistent plan of order promulgated for all to know
is foreign, seemingly repugnant, to English and American legal
minds. There are statutes, increasing in number in modem times,
but always on particular matters, and usually regarded as
modifications of the basic law, the unwritten, un-enacted, and un-
promulgated Common Law. Never have statutes achieved the
status of legislation detailing the whole of the private law. Efforts
to have lawyers and judges construe and apply comprehensive
statutes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, as complete
frames of reference, replacing all other law for their subject
matters, in the manner of Romanist codes, have failed. So great is
the tendency to apply statutes against the background Common
Law that one usually cannot say he understands a statute's effect
until the judges have construed it.
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To inform oneself of what presently is to be considered the
unwritten Common Law is a rather difficult task, even for trained
attorneys, judges, and professors. It is an impossible task for the
untrained. The best evidence of what had been considered
authoritatively to be the Common Law is in the decisions rendered
in particular suits, not founded on statutes, between particular
persons and under specific fact situations. They are applicable
retroactively and theoretically are without prospective operation. In
practice, nevertheless, previous decisions are regarded as
precedents to be followed as long as differentiating facts do not
exist or the judge determines that the precedent no longer satisfies
current notions of right order or justice, which notions have always
been the actual basic substance of the Common Law in every
period of its history. Thus, Common Law jurists often pride
themselves on their ability to actualize justice according to current
standards in every case and on not being limited by legislated
rules; but they suffer from a lack of the predictability available
through carefully prepared legislation, underestimate the flexibility
of abstractly worded rules, and ignore the retroactive character of
their decisions.
The decisions are published, but their great number, their
factual particularity and orientation, and, in our time, the diversity
of thought on the notions of good order or justice reflected in them,
make it difficult to determine what really had been declared to be
the Common Law or what is likely to be declared in the next case.
Here the English have had advantage over the Americans. Having
one hierarchy of courts, and barristers and judges devoted to
consistency in decisions and opposed to attempts to manipulate the
law to please clients or particular political parties, professionals
can give probably sound predictable opinions in consultations and
in rendering judgments. In the United States, however, the
judiciaries of fifty states each render decisions that may not be
consistent with those in other states, attorneys have no
compunction against arguing that out-of-state decisions provide
better solutions than those reached in their own states, and the
judges themselves may even render new solutions according to
their own peculiar notions of good order or justice. Indeed, the
attorney in the United States not only must inform himself of
multiple versions of the Common Law, but also must inform
himself of the notions of good order or justice held by the judge or
judges before whom he must plead his case.
How does one teach such a law? Perhaps by stressing its
methodology rather than its substance. In 1870, Dean Langdell of
the Harvard Law School declared that inasmuch as decisions were
the only authoritative evidence of what had been declared to be the
[Vol. 69
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Common Law (or the meaning of statutes), law students should
learn by studying the decisions. The "case method" became the
usual and favored way of training law students. Typically
professors select decisions in their fields of assumed competence,
order the reading of them in some fashion, quiz the students on
their opinions of the premises and reasoning of the judges, ask
them to compare the decision with others, and elicit from them
alternative reasoned solutions. Perhaps no attempt will be made to
give the students an overall account of the law on the subject. The
emphasis is on rhetoric in solving competing contentions on what
had been or might be declared to be the law in a particular case. It
is always hoped that in time the student will learn to "think as a
lawyer", the ultimate goal of the method. The branches of the law
studied are considered of lesser importance than rhetorical
exercises, and so students are permitted wide discretion in
choosing courses.
The case method quickly convinces the future professional that
Justice Cardozo must have been right when he wrote "the law
never is; it always is about to be". It is always uncertain until the
judge declares what it is in the particular circumstances. This
means the non-professional cannot avoid seeking legal advice in
important matters, even though the legal counselor himself must
share much of that uncertainty. Differences of opinion on the law
often must be settled by suit, or by compromise or negotiation,
much of which could be avoided by clear legislation. The lack of
certainty also contributes greatly to the length of legal documents,
for the parties must specify in great detail provisions that would be
totally unnecessary with Romanist type "suppletive" legislation,
legislation that supplies details of law applicable unless
contradicted by express agreement. And the uncertainty facilitates
dishonest claims and dishonest legal arguments.
The tide must be turned. It could be turned if law academics
were to give serious attention to two objectives. The first must be
to bring to Anglo-American private law the development and style
reached by the Roman legal culture with the confection and
promulgation of the French Code Civil in 1804. The whole of the
Anglo-American private law must be stated in legislation that all
can read and understand and that will be used in fact as the
exclusive basis of all professional advice and all judicial
pronouncements in the realm of private law. The reasons are clear.
Every person is entitled to a succinct statement of the legal order
under which he is to live. Lawyers should be able to provide sound
advice with minimal doubt. Judges should not have to wonder
what is the legal rule they are to construe or apply. Law students
should be able to study the substance of the law and not merely
2008]
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legal methodology. The extensive copying or imitation of the
French Code Civil style throughout the Roman legal world is proof
of the human hunger for its advantages.
Admittedly this cannot be accomplished quickly or easily. It
might not have been accomplished at all in France without the
persuasion of Napoleon Bonaparte. It could not have been
accomplished at all without the works of French jurists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who analyzed, synthesized,
and evaluated the diverse laws that prevailed in France at the time.
The effort in the United States can succeed only if its law faculties
will begin in earnest and complete a similar doctrinal study that
can provide a basis for codification. It is a project that should not
be delayed. Law faculties in the United States already know that
legal education cannot be limited to the Anglo-American law and
have begun to foster "polyjural" or "transsystemic" studies.
Perhaps students who manage to obtain sufficient knowledge of
codified law in action will begin to clamor for codification here. If
so, the American project could become a reality. It would be a
mistake, however, to ignore that uncertainty and lack of clarity in
law are fee-generative. Thus the work of codification must not be
allowed to become dominated by the practicing profession.
The second object is even more important than the first. It is to
make every effort to make certain that the legal professionals-to-be
approach their studies with absolute integrity, recognizing that
people are not mere individuals, but members of a community of
mankind, morally obliged to respect and cooperate with each other
for the common good, and morally obliged to respect the legal
order as the specification of the manner in which these obligations
are defined and executed in their society.
To that end, liberal education should be a minimum
requirement for all legal professionals, and that liberal education
must be better than that of the secularist educators, who have
ignored metaphysics and revelation.
What purported revelation is true, if any, is a matter of faith.
But legal professionals, being, in the words of Ulpian and
Justinian, "priests of right order" in the societal lives of men, must
be acquainted with the impact various religions based on alleged
revelations, whether true or false, have had on the lives of people.
It must be part of their liberal education.
Metaphysical philosophy is another matter. It must not be
ignored in any man's education. It is the exercise of a faculty that
all men possess, the only faculty through which they might fulfill
their yearning for knowledge of who they are, what relations they
have to the rest of being, and what obligations to others result
therefrom.
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Secularists deny the validity of metaphysical conclusions, and
therefore their relevance to men, because they can not be
demonstrated. They can not prove this negative to be true, but have
succeeded in having their thought prevail simply by ignoring
metaphysics in all their endeavors, especially in education, as
Cardinal John Henry Newman predicted they would in 1854. There
is no justification for this. The speculative thought process is the
same for the natural scientist and the metaphysical philosopher.
Only the objects of their inquiries are different. The natural
scientist will seek the implications of observed phenomena for as
yet unobserved, but potentially observable, phenomena. The
metaphysical philosopher will seek the implications of observed
phenomena for unobservable phenomena. The natural scientist will
want to confirm his conclusions with demonstrations, but often
will be certain enough to act upon them before he has
demonstrated their truth. The metaphysical philosopher must rely
either on logical necessity or on the consistency, coherence, and
compatibility of his inferences from observed phenomena.
The metaphysician, for example, logically can be certain a
creating and sustaining God exists, for otherwise there is no
explanation why anything exists. For his proof of other aspects of
the unobservable, however, the metaphysician must rely on the
accuracy of his inferences from the observable. Thus the
ontological community of mankind can be inferred from their
observably unavoidable interdependency, and the ontological
moral obligation of each person to respect and cooperate with
every other, as occasions arise and permit, logically follows from
the fact of the ontological community. Thereafter, the manner in
which the unspecified general obligation to respect and cooperate
with others in a particular society is a matter of practical reason, of
fitting moral means to moral ends. It is the vocation of legal
professionals.
To summarize this all too summary reflection, legal education
can improve the competence and character of future legal
professionals, and indirectly their service to people, by making
certain, in pre-legal studies, or at least in preliminary studies in law
school, that they understand the nature and purpose of law, its
moral foundations, and their own moral obligations in its
articulation and application; and, furthermore, legal academicians
could improve and simplify the effective promulgation of the law,
thereby increasing laymen's knowledge of it and facilitating law
study, law practice, and the judicial process, by moving rapidly
toward codification in modem Romanist style.
Probably, Robert Maynard Hutchins would have agreed.
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